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Responsibilities and Jurisdiction
Subsequent to ExtraterritorialApprehension
JIANMING SHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION

On April 2, 1990, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican
national, was forcibly abducted from his medical office in Guadalajara,
Mexico. He was taken on board an airplane and flown to El Paso,
Texas. He was then arrested by officials of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and indicted for allegedly participating in the
torture and murder of DEA field agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.
Alvarez-Machain allegedly injected Camarena with the stimulant lidocaine, prolonging his life so that Camarena's capturers could continue
to torture and interrogate him.'
The DEA apparently authorized and sponsored the abduction of
Alvarez-Machain without prior consent of the Mexican Government.
Mexico made several, specific, formal diplomatic protests to the U.S.
Government stating that the abduction violated the Mexico-U.S. Extradition Treaty as well as general principles of international law.
The Mexican Government repeatedly demanded his immediate release
and return to Mexico and added that it would try, prosecute, and punish Dr. Alvarez-Machain upon his repatriation. Mexico also demanded
extradition of those U.S. agents responsible for the abduction to be
tried in Mexico.
On August 10, 1990, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California' found that the kidnapping violated the Treaty of
Extradition between the United States and Mexico3 and, therefore,
that it lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Alvarez-Machain. The Court or-

* S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1994; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania,
1988; M.A., University of Denver, 1984; LL.B., Peking University, 1983. Formerly a
faculty member of the International Law Institute of Peking University, Beijing,
China. The author would like to extend his appreciation to Blake Thompson and his
colleagues of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy for their patient
and helpful editing of this article.
1. See William Branigin, Mexico to Seek Extradition of Alleged Kidnap Leader;
Ex-policeman Living in Los Angeles Named, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1990, at A21; Michael Isikoff, Extradition of DEA Agent, Informant Sought; Mexico's Request Surprises, Concerns U.S. Officials, WASH. POST, Jul. 21, 1990, at A4; See also Larry Ronter,

Mexico Detains 4 Officers in Abduction of Doctor in U.S., N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 27, 1990,
at A8.

2. United States v. Caro-Quintero, et al., 745 F.Supp. 599, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
3. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-United Mexican States, 31
U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
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dered the release and repatriation of Dr. Alvarez back to Mexico.4 On
October 18, 1991, on appeal by the United States, the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The
Ninth Circuit believed that there remained "no question about the
adequacy of Mexico's protests

. . .

or about Mexico's demand for repa-

triation"5 and emphasized that Dr. Alvarez-Machain "must be returned" because his "forcible abduction from Mexico by agents of DEA
violated the 1980 [Extradition] Treaty" between the United States and
Mexico."
On June 15, 1992, upon further appeal by the United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's holding, holding
that the U.S. Government may abduct wanted criminals abroad (including foreign nationals) and prosecute them in the courts of the
United States, even if the abduction violates international law. The
Court further stated that the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals
so abducted would be barred only if it was expressly prohibited by an
applicable extradition treaty and if the offended foreign state demanded the return of the abducted individual.7
A State that conducts, authorizes, supports, or sponsors extraterritorial abduction violates a well established principle of international
law. When one State exercises its police power in the territory of another State, it exceeds its sphere of jurisdiction permitted under international law, and it violates a fundamental tenet of international law,
the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.8 This
article considers whether a State may exercise jurisdiction over an
abducted individual or otherwise continue to take advantage of the initial illegality of the abduction.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the abducting State does not
divest itself of jurisdiction simply because the abduction violates "general international law principles." Instead, jurisdiction is barred only

4. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 614.
5. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter Alvarez-Machain].
6. Id.
7. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2196-2197, 119 L.Ed.2d
441, 60 U.S.L.W. 4523 (1992) [hereinafter Alvarez.Machain III.
8. See, e.g., 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 295 (8th ed.,
Hersch Lauterpacht 1955); JOSEPH G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 100-101 (10th ed. 1989); MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 135 (2nd ed.
1986); WESLEY GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (1957);
DOMINIQUE CARREAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 11 843 et seq. (1986). See also Charter
of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1945 at San Francisco, effective Oct. 24,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 145 B.F.S.P. 805, T.S. 993, art. 2(4); Charter of the Organization of American States, signed Apr. 30 1948 at Bogota, effective Dec. 13, 1951, 2
U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 1, 3, 10, 11, 18 and 20; Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States (ILC, 1949), art. 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 432(2) (Revised, 1987).

1994

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPREHENSION

where "a term prohibiting international abductions" is specifically
included in the applicable treaty of extradition.9 Dissenting Justice
Stevens called this holding "shocking" and "monstrous" and stated that
it would "deeply disturb... most courts throughout the civilized
world."' °
In Alvarez-Machain II, the court seems to have either ignored the
existence of customary international law or denied its binding force.
This article advises that all domestic courts, being a part of the government of the State, should take judicial notice of and give effect to
the rules and principles of both customary and conventional international law, and should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over individuals seized or abducted by means in violation of international law.
Extraterritorial abduction in violation of international law does not
give rise to any right, including the "right" to exercise jurisdiction. In
addition, the offended State is entitled to remedies, and the offending
State is obligated to undo its wrongs, regardless of whether the offended State protests or demands remedies.
The purpose of this article is not to challenge the existence of
jurisdiction of a State over individuals whom it deems to have violated
its domestic laws. Rather, this article questions the exercise of such jurisdiction following an illegal abduction and seeks to nullify both the
initial act of abduction and the subsequent prosecution by arguing as
follows.
A State may exercise its jurisdiction to subject an offender to its
law by means that do not violate international law, but it may not
exercise jurisdiction over an individual by means that infringe upon
the territorial sovereignty of another State. This violates international
law because the offending State lacks jurisdiction to abduct and apprehend the individual. As a result, the boundary of jurisdiction of municipal courts stops where the jurisdiction of the State stops. Since the
abducting State is obligated to return the abducted individual and
otherwise undo its wrong, it would be a further international wrong for
the courts of the abducting State to try and prosecute an individual
who was illegally abducted.
II. THE KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE
AND THE ROOTS OF ALVAREZ-MACHAIN II
A. HistoricalBackground
The holding of Alvarez-Machain II is not without precedent. Rather, it is another improper application of the unfounded doctrine that a

9. Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct. at 2196.
10. Id. at 2205, 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Blackmun and

O'Connor).
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court may try and prosecute a defendant who was abducted by irregular means, that the court retains jurisdiction despite such irregularity,
and that the decision to repatriate the abducted should be made solely
by the executive branch of the Government.
Several early English and American cases held in favor of exercising jurisdiction over illegally seized persons or things. For example,
in Ex parte Susannnah Scott,11 the illegal arrest by a British policeman in Brussels was held not to vitiate the jurisdiction of the English
court, though it may be that Belgium had agreed to the arrest. In The
Ship Richmond case, 2 an American warship entered the territorial
waters of East Florida, then under the sovereignty of Spain, and seized
a U.S. private vessel. The vessel was then forfeited to the United
States government for the violation by its owner of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court
wrote that
[tihe seizure of an American vessel within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign power, is certainly an offence against that power,
which must be adjusted between the two governments. This court
can take no cognizance of it; and the majority of the court is of
opinion that the law does not connect that trespass.., with the
subsequent seizure by the civil authority, under the process of the
District Court, so as to annul the proceedings of that court against
the vessel.
Similarly, in The Merino case, 4 U.S. military authorities seized
American vessels in the bay of Pensacola, Florida, still under Spanish
sovereignty, and the vessels were forfeited for the violation of laws prohibiting the trade in slaves. The Court held that the trespass on Spanish territory was not so connected with the subsequent seizure as to
defeat the jurisdiction of the District Court."
In State of Vermont v. Brewster," Vermont authorities entered
Canada and forcibly abducted a Canadian and removed him to the
United States to stand indictment and trial. The accused moved for

11. Ex parte Susannnah Scott, 9 B. & C. 446 (1829). See also R. v. Plymouth
Justices, ex parte Driver 1986] Q.B. 95, [19851 All E.R. 611, 77 I.L.R. 351.
12. In re The Ship Richmond, 9 Cr. 102 (1815).
13. Id. at 104.
14. In re The Merino, 9 Wheat 391 (1824).
15. Both The Ship Richmond and The Merino cases were relied on by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2196 n. 15. Dickinson criticized
the court for its decisions in The Ship Richmond and The Merino cases, stating that
Justice Marshall "was clearly wrong, in the light of later authorities, for the courts
have no hesitation in ordering restoration or release against the executive, where the
case has been submitted to the court and a clear violation of accepted international
law is admitted or proved." Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or
Arrest in Violation of InternationalLaw, 28 AM. J. INT'L. L. 231, 241 (1934).
16. State of Vermont v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
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dismissal of the indictment due to the extraterritorial nature of the abduction. The Vermont Supreme Court held that "[it becomes immaterial whether the prisoner was brought out of Canada" by means that
violate the sovereignty of Canada. The court further stated that
[tihe illegality, if any, consists in a violation of the sovereignty of
an independent nation. If that nation complain[s], it is a matter
which concerns the political relations of the two countries, and in
that aspect is a subject not within the constitutional powers of this
court. 17

In 1886, the United States Supreme Court decided the well-known
case of Ker v. Illinois.18 Frederick M. Ker, a U.S. citizen, was wanted
in Illinois on charges of larceny and embezzlement, so he fled to Peru.
The Governor of Illinois, in accordance with an extradition treaty between the U.S. and Peru, dispatched an agent to request Ker's extradition to stand trial in Illinois. The agent was unable to execute the
request for extradition to the Peruvian government because Chilean
forces occupied Lima at the time. The agent requested assistance from
the military governor appointed by Chile, personally arrested Ker, and
took him back to Illinois, where he was convicted of larceny. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and Ker appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Ker alleged that the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction because he
had been kidnapped in Peru and forcibly brought to Cook County without the proper process of extradition. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the argument that Ker's arrest and conviction violated the extradition
treaty between the United States and Peru. The court held that the
"mere irregularities in the manner in which [Ker was] ... brought into
the custody of the law" did not entitle him to escape prosecution. 9
The court also rejected the argument that the U.S.-Peruvian extradition treaty protected Ker from being taken out of Peru. Instead, it held
that the treaty merely limited the extent to which a government may
voluntarily grant asylum to a fugitive, and the parties to the treaty
simply agreed that upon proper demand and proceedings the asylum
State had a duty to transfer the fugitive to the demanding party
State.20 The court upheld jurisdiction, stating that the proper remedy
for the breach of international law was at the diplomatic level, and the
physical presence of the accused before the Court, no matter how he
had been brought there, sufficed to validate the proceedings.2'
In 1952, U.S. Supreme Court again applied this principle in
Frisbie v. Collins, which involved the forcible abduction of a criminal
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
Id. at 440.
Id. at 442.

21. Id.

DENV. J. INTL L. & POLY

VOL. 23:1

from one constituent state of the United States to another.' Collins
was indicted in the State of Michigan for murder, and he fled to Chicago, Illinois to escape from justice. Michigan authorities sent police
officers to Chicago, and they "forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked,
and took" Collins back to Michigan where he was convicted of murder
and sentenced to life in prison. Collins filed a federal habeas corpus action, claiming that his conviction should be declared null and void because his trial violated the due process clause and the Federal Kidnapping Act.' The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, stating that
[tihis Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois... that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not

impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by [manner] of a "forcible abduction." No persuasive
reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases.
They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied
when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been
fairly apprized [sic] of the charges against him and after a fair trial
in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards."
After Frisbie, the Ker doctrine became known as the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine.'
Frisbie,however, was solely a domestic case without any
international significance. It did not involve any issue of international
law at all. It concerned the abduction and removal of an individual
from one internal territorial unit of a federal State and his subjection
to the jurisdiction of another such internal territorial unit. It is difficult to see any reason why the Frisbie case has frequently been cited
along with Ker in the discussion on the exercise of jurisdiction following seizures in violation of international law. Indeed, the so-called KerFrisbie doctrine would be better read simply as the Ker doctrine, as
Frisbie has no bearing upon cases involving forcible or fraudulent
abductions in violation of international law. Reference to the case of
Frisbie should in fact disappear from future international law literature.
In any event, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has frequently been applied
and cited as authority for the proposition that the manner in which an
individual is physically brought within the reach of a State's authority
is irrelevant to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over him.2" Both Ker

22. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
23. Id. at 519-20.
24. Id. at 522.
25. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L. L. 67886 (1953); Andrew Campbell, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in
the War on Drugs, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 385 (1990).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015 (1925), Ann. Dig., 19191942 (Suppl. vol.), Case No. 53; Collier v. Vaccoro, 51 F.2d 17 (1931); United States
v. Insull, 8 F.Supp. 310 (1934), Ann. dig., 1933-1934, Case No. 75; U.S. v.
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and Frisbie, however, implied the condition that the doctrine does not
apply where the irregularity of acquiring a criminal would divest the
court of its jurisdiction, such as where the irregularity amounts to a
violation of international law.
B. Critique of the Ker-FrisbieDoctrine
In Alvarez-Machain II, the Supreme Court relied on the KerFrisbie doctrine, stating that "the court need not inquire as to how [Dr.
Alvarez-Machain] came before it."27 The Ker-Frisbie doctrine, however, does not apply when the abduction violates international law, so it
should not apply to the Alvarez-Machain II case. The doctrine is limited to allowing the State to bring an individual before the court by
any means up to the point of violating international law.'
In Ker, the unauthorized seizure of the accused was made by an
Illinois official who acted "without any pretence of authority" from the
government of the United States; the Illinois agent acted outside of his
scope of authority. He was sent to execute a request for Ker's extradition, not to abduct him. The Ker court upheld jurisdiction over Ker
under a necessary assumption that since the agent acted in excess of
his scope of authority, neither the state of Illinois nor the United
States was in breach of international law. As a result, the Ker doctrine
is inapplicable in any abduction case that involves a violation of international law.
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is an ironic holding "coming as it does
from the courts of a country where treaties are the supreme law of the
land."' Felice Morgenstern argues that one of the probable reasons
for the doctrine might be that courts "have been misled by the sweeping terms of decisions in cases where the seizure of a fugitive, though
irregular, was not in violation of international law." The courts in

Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1952), rehearing denied in no. 22201, April 18,
1952; U.S. v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1957); United States y. Winter, 509

F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423
U.S. 825 (1975); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (refusing to "retreat
from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction") citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976); United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463 (1980); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1981); INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468-U.S. 1032, 1039-1040 (1984) (foreign national summoned to deposition hearing following illegal arrest); United States v. Evans, 667 F.Supp. 974,
980 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988);
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
27. Alvarez-Machan I, 112 S.Ct., at 2193.
28. The illegality of the means of recovery of a criminal under the domestic law
of the court may also divest the court of its jurisdiction, but that topic is not within
the scope of this article.
29, Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 265, 269 (1952).
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these cases have "used phraseology of general applicability which is
both misleading and indicative of the lack of awareness on the part of
these tribunals that there are circumstances in which the illegality of
the seizure vitiates the jurisdiction of the court.""
Morgenstern notes an abundance of "cases in which there has
been a seizure of a fugitive by authorized officials of the pursuing state
on the territory of the state of refuge in clear violation of one of the
most fundamental rules of customary international law." She further
comments that the refusal or failure of the courts "to consider the
manner in which an accused individual was brought before them has
sometimes been due to an imperfect appreciation of the implications of
the exercise of jurisdiction after an illegal seizure." In addition,
Morgenstern notes that there have been times in which courts in this
connection have relied
on earlier decisions in which the seizure was not a violation of international law ... [Where] courts have occasionally failed in this
sphere to affirm their readiness to enforce international law, they
have done so for reasons unconnected with the merits of the subject
under discussion. Their decisions thus cannot be said to affect the
principle ... that an arrest in violation of internationallaw can
have no legal effect (emphasis added)."'
The so-called Ker-Frisbie doctrine, as Justice Stevens said in
Alvarez-Machain II, is based on a common law principle that "any person may, at his peril, seize property which has become forfeited to, or
forfeitable by, the Government; and that proceedings by the Government to enforce a forfeiture ratify a seizure made by one without authority, since ratification is equivalent to antecedent delegation of
authority to seize."32 Under that principle, the assumption is that a
government has the authority under law to authorize the seizure of
forfeitable property. For a government to subsequently ratify private
conduct done without authority, there must be a premise that the government had the actual authority to authorize that conduct in the first
place, no matter whether it actually exercised that authority. If the
government does not have the authority to pre-authorize an act, then
it certainly does not have the subsequent authority to sanction or ratify the act, and such sanction or ratification in that circumstance would
certainly constitute a breach of the law, domestically, internationally,
or both.
In the Ker example, suppose that the United States had reached a
prior agreement with Peru that in the event the extradition of a crimi-

30. Id. at 269, 270.
31. Id. at 273-274.
32. Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gelston
v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 310, 4 L.Ed. 381 (1818); Taylor v. United States, 3 How.
197, 205-206, 11 L.Ed. 559 (1845)).
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nal should become impossible due to war or similar situation, the requesting party State might, at its own peril and expenses, send agents
to the territory of the other party State to apprehend and remove an
extraditable criminal. Further suppose that it had been known and acknowledged that the Chilean military occupation of Peru's capital
would be likely to make it impossible to effectuate Ker's extradition. In
that case, the United States would have possessed the power to authorize the Illinois agent to kidnap Ker in Peru and take him back to the
United States. If the United States had the authority to authorize
Ker's abduction, but did not exercise that authority to allow the Illinois
agent to apprehend Ker prior to his dispatch, then it would still have
been able to subsequently ratify Ker's apprehension despite the irregularity of his seizure. In this situation, the doctrine stated in Ker would
be valid and might apply.
The Ker doctrine, however, should not have been applied even to
Ker itself. Neither the state of Illinois nor the United States had the
power under international law, the extradition treaty, or any other
agreements between the United States and Peru to authorize the abduction of Ker in Peru. As a result, neither Illinois nor the United
States had the authority to give subsequent approval or ratification of
the unauthorized apprehension. When the United States failed to return Ker to Peru and exercised jurisdiction over him, it effectively ratified the unauthorized apprehension. Since the United States ab initio
lacked the power to authorize the abduction, it violated the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Peru, a violation of international law and of
the U.S.-Peruvian extradition treaty then in force. The doctrine stating
that the manner in which a criminal is brought to justice is immaterial
and, therefore, is wrongly applied in Ker and in many subsequent
cases.
In Ker, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to address Ker's alternative
argument that forcible abduction of an individual from a foreign State
violated customary international law and therefore constituted a bar to
the exercise of jurisdiction over such individual by the courts of the abducting State following the forcible abduction.' Its further failure to
order the return of Ker to Peru constituted a true breach of international law.
A unique abduction case in the history of international law is
presented in the famous Eichmann Incident." Former Gestapo Chief

33. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
34. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 219-231 (1963);
Hans W. Baade, Eichmann Trial: Some Legal Aspects, 1961 DUKE L.J. 400 (1961);

J.E.S. Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 181 (1962); L.C. Green,
Aspects juridiques du procts Eichmann, 1963 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS 150; L.C. Green,
The Eichmann Case, 23 MODERN L. REv. 507 (1960) [hereinafter Green, Eichmann];
D. Lasok, The Eichmann Trial, 11 I.C.L.Q. 355 (1962); Matthew Lippman, The TriaL
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Adolf Eichmann fled to Argentina after World War II. In May 1960, he
was kidnapped in Argentina by Israeli officials and/or agents - in the
name of "private volunteers" - and was eventually brought to Israel
where he was charged with crimes against the Jewish people, crimes
against humanity, crimes of war, and crimes of membership in hostile
organizations. In December 1961, Eichmann was convicted on all
charges and sentenced to death.' On May 29, 1962, the Supreme
Court of Israel affirmed the decision of the lower court, and Eichmann
was hanged on May 31, 1962.36

While doubt remains, few have challenged the jurisdiction of the
Israeli court to try Eichmann as a war criminal. Indeed, the Eichmann
case "was so extreme, so unique, so horrendous" that a court before
which Eichmann appeared "could not possibly be expected not to exercise [jurisdiction] or even to ask whether it should be exercised."" The
"singular character" of Eichmann's crime rendered "the exercise of
jurisdiction a duty, but at the same time should not in any sense be allowed to supply the standard applicable in other, different cases (emphasis added)."'
The uniqueness of the Eichmann case exists in the following facts:
First, Israeli authorities alleged that they were not involved in the
initial kidnapping, and the abduction was planned for and carried out
solely by its private citizens. Second, Israel's apology and Argentina's
renouncement of its claim to Eichmann served to strengthen Israel's
exercise of jurisdiction over him. Third, and most important,
Eichmann's crimes were such that his capture, trial, and death penalty
were overwhelmingly welcomed at the time. There has been no comparable case worldwide. Neither Ker nor the Alvarez-Machain case bears
any resemblance with, nor did the U.S. Supreme Court in AlvarezMachain II seem to have relied on, the Eichmann case.
The following section of this article examines the responsibilities
of states under international law when conduting abductions of ac-

of Adolph Eichmann and the Protection of Universal Human Rights under International Law, 5 Hous. J. INT' L. 1 28 (1982) (the Israeli government authorized the
kidnapping); PETER PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (1964); Helen Silving, In re
Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INTL. L. 307 (1961).
35. Att.-Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, Judgment of Dec. 11, 1961 of the District
Court of Jerusalem, translated and reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 18-276, at 273-276, 56
A.J.I.L. 805 (1962).
36. Att.-Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, Judgment of May 29, 1962 of the Supreme
Court of Israel, translated and reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 277, at 342. A summary of the
judgments of the District Court of Jerusalem and of the Supreme Court of Israel
appears at 36 I.L.R. 5.
37. F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYs IN
HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 407-422, 414 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory, eds.,
1989).
38. Id.
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cused criminals in other sovereign States.
III.

ABDUCTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

In terms of the degree of responsibility and international consequence, there is a distinction between a wrongful seizure by a private
citizen or an official acting extra vires and an abduction expressly
authorized or sponsored by the government of a State. 9 Abduction
under the direct authorization or sponsorship of a Government is presumably subject to more severe international consequences than seizures conducted solely by private citizens or unauthorized State officials or agents subsequently ratified by the Government. Nevertheless,
whether initially authorized, sponsored, or subsequently adopted or
ratified by the Government, unauthorized extraterritorial abductions
violate the territorial sovereignty of the offended State and should not
have any legal effect under international law - i.e., no jurisdiction
may be based on an act that violates international law.
A. ResponsibilitiesArising out of State-SponsoredAbduction
After an unauthorized international abduction has occurred, the
first obligation of the abducting State is to undo its wrong by returning
the abducted individual to his country of refuge or residence. Where
the abducted individual comes before the court of the abducting State,
the court must minimize the consequence of the abduction by ordering
the return of the individual to the State where he was abducted.
On the "consequences of violation of territorial limits of law enforcement," the official comment to section 423(2) of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States correctly states this rule:
If a state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the
territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is
entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation
from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may
demand return of the person, and internationallaw requires that
he be returned (emphasis added).'
The Statute of the International Court of Justice authorizes the
International Court of Justice to issue the equivalent of an injunction
against the abducting State in the form of an Order providing interim
measures of protection. The Court may then order the return of the
abducted individual in order to re-establish the status quo ante.41 Ac-

39. Cf Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
423(2), cmt. c (Revised, 1987).
41. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. Article 41(1) of the Statute provides that "Ithe Court
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cording to the Permanent Court of International Justice, "[rieparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed."42 The Court may order
reparation by way of damages should the return of the kidnapped
criminal no longer be possible."3
An abducting State committing an international wrong must
make appropriate restitution to the offended State." The law of remedies at international law requires that under no circumstances may
forcible and fraudulent abduction in violation of international law be
forgiven or go unpunished. Remedies to the offended State include
restoration, public apology, a promise not to commit acts of the same
nature again, extradition (upon request) of the abducting officers or
responsible individuals, and damages to the injured State. The most
important remedies, however, are the repatriation of the abducted
individual to the country where the abduction took place and the punishment or extradition of officials or "private citizens" committing or
responsible for the abduction. As Laurence Preuss stated, "a violation
of foreign territory undoubtedly engages the responsibility of the State
of arrest, which is under a clear duty to restore the prisoner and to
punish or extradite the offending officers."4" In addition,
[elvery state that commits an international tort against another
state is bound by customary international law to make reparation
therefor, [and it is] well established by state practice that the state
on whose territory a purported fugitive from justice has been forcibly abducted by agents of another state can demand of the latter
the return of the person abducted, and the disciplinary or criminal
punishment of the abductors."
Several early examples show such State practice. In 1807, the
British man-of-war Leopard attacked an American frigate, the Chesapeake, while searching for and arresting deserters from the Royal
Navy. The British Government subsequently offered to take disciplinary measures against the captain of the Leopard, to pay money dam-

shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of
either party."
42. Chorz6w Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A),
No. 13, at 47.
43. See Georg Schwarzenberger, Fundamental Principles of InternationalLaw, 87
RECUEIL DES COORS 195, 353-354 (1955).
44. See, e.g., 1 GEORG DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 250-251 (1958); 1 GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 562-564 (3rd ed., 1957); Chorz6w Factory

(Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 9, at 21; Corfu Channel Case (Great
Britain v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 23.
45. Laurence Preuss, Kidnapping Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29
AM. J. INTL L. 502, 505 (1935).

46. Baade, supra note 34, at 406.
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ages to those injured, and to restore to the United States those individuals removed from the Chesapeake.47 In 1841, the British Government
returned to the United States a Grogan who had been seized by British 8soldiers on the territory of the United States and taken to Cana4
da.
The British Law Officers also advised that in cases where foreign
nations seized or arrested individuals or vessels in British territory or
territorial waters without prior consent from Great Britain, the British
Government had the right to claim their restoration.49 In the matter
of Patrick Lawler, ° a fugitive escaped from prison in Gibraltar, Great
Britain and was recaptured by a British prison officer in Algeciras,
Spain. The Law Officers of the Crown advised that an
order ought to be given for setting Lawler at liberty immediately .... If any doubt exists, as to what the circumstances really
were, inquiry should of course be made; but, for the present, we
assume that M. Isturitz has been correctly informed of the facts. If
so, a violation of Spanish territory was committed by the Warder
Nicholls, in removing Lawler over and out of Spanish ground...
for the purpose of restoring him to a penal custody at Gibraltar,
from which he had escaped into Spain. For we regard the removal,
if effected as alleged by means of drugging or intoxication, as being
a removal clearly without consent, and as involving the same international consequences, as if it had been accomplished by force. A
plain breach of international law having occurred, we deem it to be
the duty of the state, into whose territory the individual thus
wrongfully deported was conveyed, to restore the aggrieved state,
upon its request to that effect, as far as possible to its original
position.... [Tiherefore,. . . we recommend that notice be given to

the Spanish authorities that, at a given time and place (the place
being a convenient spot on the Spanish confines) Lawler will be set
at liberty, and allowed to choose his own course: and he should be
disposed of accordingly."'
In the 1860 Trent Incident, two commissioners from the then
Confederate States of America and their secretaries, on their way to
Europe, were apprehended and removed from the Royal Mail-Packet
Trent by the United States Federal Navy. A correspondence from a
high-level British official to Lord Lyons, the British ambassador in
Washington, dated November 30, 1860, stated as follows:

47. See Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT.

Y.B. INT'L. L. 279, 293-294 (1960).
48. See Preuss, supra note 45, at 505-506, citing 1 JOHN BASSET MOORE, TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 282-283 (1891).

49. 1 LoRD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 80-82 (1956).

50. In re Patrick Lawler, 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 78-79.
51. 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 78-79. See also In re McClure, 1 McNAIR,
supra note 49, at 76-77.
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It thus appears that certain individuals have been taken from on
board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral Power, while such
vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage, an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of
international law. ..

. Her Majesty's

Government, therefore,

trust[s] that when this matter [has] been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government
will, of its own accord, offer to the British Government such redress
as alone would satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of
the four gentlemen, and their delivery to your Lordship, in order
that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.'
In certain cases between the United States and Mexico, in the
latter part of the 19th century,' and in the Vincenti case between the
United States and the United Kingdom in 1920,' "the normal practice was to terminate the proceedings against the kidnapped offender
and... often to offer to return him to the state from which he had
been brought and to extradite the kidnappers in accordance with the
treaty, if their extradition should be requested.""5 For instance, in the
1887 Nogales Incident, a Mexican officer committed an offense on the
United States side of the international boundary with Mexico and was
arrested by the local police. A Mexican officer and two soldiers crossed
the boundary and rescued him by force. The U.S. Government demanded the return of the offending Mexican officer and stated that "it becomes.., the simple international duty of the Mexican Government to
undo the wrong committed by its own soldiery, by restoring the rescued prisoners [sic] to the jurisdiction from which they had been
wrongfully taken."'
In 1935, Jacob Salomon, an ex-German Jew then residing in Switzerland, was kidnapped by Nazi agents and taken from Switzerland to
Germany, but the Swiss government subsequently obtained his release. 7 More recently, in September 1981, two professional bondsmen
kidnapped Sidney L. Jaffe, a bail skipper, from his residence in Cana-

52. Correspondence respecting the Seizure of Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarlland
and Eustis, from on aboard the Royal Mail-Packet "Trent" by the Commander of the
U.S. Ship "San Fancinto,"52 Parl. Pap. 607 (1862). See also H.W. Malkin, The Trent
and the China, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 66 (1924).
53. For such cases, see 2 GREEN HAYWORD HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 309-312 (1941).
54. Id. at 320.
55. Green, Eichmann, supra note 34, at 510.
56. 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (1906). The
demand was subsequently withdrawn when Mexico offered to try the offender.
57. For comments on the kidnapping of Herr Jacob-Salomon by German agents
from Switzerland in 1935 and his release, see Preuss, supra note 45; Laurence
Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Switzerland-Germany), 30 AM. J.
INT'L L. 123 (1936); Lasok, supra note 34, at 355 n.4.
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da and took him back to Florida.' Jaffe was tried, convicted, and sentenced to consecutive prison terms totalling 145 years.59 Canada,
which maintained an extradition treaty with the United States, protested against the abduction and trial and filed an action in the U.S.
District Court in Florida." Following the Canadian protests, U.S. Attorney General William French Smith and Secretary of State George
M. Shultz petitioned the Florida Probation and Parole Commission for
a hearing to consider granting an early parole release date for Jaffe."'
In 1983, after Jaffe had been jailed for two years, a Florida appeals
court overturned Jaffe's fraud conviction because of procedural errors
and ordered Jaffe's release from prison in September 1983.2 Jaffe
was subsequently paroled in November 1983.
In the Alvarez-Machain trial, the U.S. District Court rightfully
ordered the repatriation of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to Mexico,' and, on
the first appeal, the U.S. Appellate Court properly affirmed that order.6 The trial court stated that "[i]t is axiomatic that the United
States or Mexico violates its contracting partner's sovereignty, and the
extradition treaty, when it unilaterally abducts a person from the
territory of its contracting partner without the participation of or authorization from the contracting partner where the offended state registers an official protest."' While a protest is not essential to the nature of illegal abduction and its consequences, the court correctly held
that the remedy in that case should have been "the immediate return
of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the territory of Mexico."'
Not only are States precluded from abducting individuals in the
territory of another State, they also may not utilize the territory of
another State to transport a criminal captured in its own territory or
in the territory of a third State. The duty to return the captured individual may arise in either situation. For example, in the opinion of the
Law Officers of the British Crown, where British authorities conveyed
a criminal through the territory of the United States without having
obtained prior consent, the British Government could not resist an
American claim for his surrender. 7 In the matter of Martin, a British
subject, who was allegedly a naturalized U.S. citizen, was convicted of

58. See Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.Supp. 1371, 1373 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
59. Id. at 1374.
60. Id. at 1374 (referring to In re Application of Canada 83-661-Civ-j-16).
61. Letter from Secretary of State Shultz to Florida Probation and Parole Commission (July 22, 1983). See Return of Land-sales Figure for Florida Jailing is
Assailed, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1983, at A6. See also Fred Barbash, Parole of Convicted Canadian Becomes an International Issue, WASH. POST, July 27, 1983, at A2.
62. See Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.Supp. at 1374.
63. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 614.
64. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991).
65. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 610.
66. Id. at 614.
67. In re Martin, 2 MOORE, supra note 56, at 371, 373.
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assault and escape from custody at Laketon, British Columbia and was
sentenced to jail in Victoria. As he was conveyed in custody from
Laketon to Victoria, "a portion of the journey [passed] through Alaska."
The United States demanded his return on the ground that his transportation through Alaska was "a violation of the Sovereignty of the
United States which rendered his further detention unjustified." The
opinion of the British Law Officers advised that the United States had
the full right "to demand the liberation of the prisoner even after he
has left those territories in which he was detained and from which he
has been taken without the authority and in violation of the law of the
country," and that such right to request the release of the prisoner
from the foreign power is "not affected by the fact that the prisoner is
a subject of that foreign power.'
The rationale for returning an abducted individual to his country
of refuge is not that his alleged violation of the law of the abducting
State should not be made subject to the criminal proceedings of that
State, but that the abducting State should not have acquired custody
of the accused individual by means in violation of the territorialsovereignty of another nation and of international law. The violation of
international law is a much more serious offense than the individual's
violation of the law of the abducting State.
The State whose domestic law had allegedly been violated might
have otherwise been entitled to take custody of and exercise jurisdiction over the alleged individual offender had there been no offense
against another State or violation of international law. For example,
where an extradition treaty applies, the State that wishes to try an individual abroad may assume jurisdiction by following procedures established under the treaty, short of forcible abduction. In the absence
of an extradition treaty, jurisdiction may be exercised only under the
following circumstances: (1) where prior consent and/or cooperation of
the State of refuge or residence had been obtained; or (2) where the
wanted individual, voluntarily and free from force or fraud, happened
to be travelling (a) in the territory of the wanting State, (b) in the
territory of a third State where the arresting State had acquired consent or cooperation, or (c) in international areas, such as on the high
seas, where the abducting State might exercise the right of hot pursuit
or similar rights permitted under international law. Under these circumstances, there would be no violation of the territorial sovereignty of
the country where the arrested individual had been residing or seeking
refuge. The arresting State could lawfully subject the accused to local
proceedings, and it would not be under any obligation to return the
individual to his country of residence or refuge.
Jurisdiction, however, becomes divested, voided, and nullified

68. 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 79.
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whenever it is acquired, realized, or exercised in violation of international law. The justification, however magnificent it might be at domestic law, for acquiring, trying, and punishing a wanted criminal
must yield to the rules of international law. This is particularly so
when the offended State lodges formal protests and demands the return of the individual abducted in violation of its territorial sovereignty, although the duty to return is not necessarily contingent upon such
demands. J.E.S. Fawcett, though frequently referring to a "right" of
the kidnapping State to try the abductee, acknowledges that "the demand for the reconduction of the offender must prevail over the right
of the State having custody of him, to try him for an offence against its
law, for the practical reason that the State cannot both comply with
the demand and retain him for trial." 9 The word "demand" must be
read to include both a "formal demand" by the offended State and the
"implied demand" by the requirement of international law to return.
As Lord McNair pointed out, the remedy under international law "for
the wrongful recapture of an escaped prisoner was the restitutio in
integrum of the aggrieved State, whose territory had been violated, by
releasing the prisoner."70
Abductions might also entail the request by the offended State for
extradition of the kidnappers, and the kidnappers may face criminal or
civil charges in either the kidnapping State or the State where the
kidnapping took place." The Ker v. Illinois court, while sustaining
jurisdiction over the criminal abducted abroad, held that Peru could
seek extradition of the kidnapping Illinois agent on charges of abduction, and stated that the kidnappers might be prosecuted for illegal
abduction in a foreign country."2
There have been cases in which individuals who had forcefully
abducted criminal fugitives or suspects abroad to the United States
eventually found themselves to be standing trial for such extraterritorial abductions. For example, in the Collier case73 American and Canadian officials, for the purpose of suppressing narcotics trade, ad-

69. Fawcett, supra note 34, at 199. See also In re Blair, reported in 1 MOORE,
supra note 48, at 285, concerning the release, upon the demand of the United States
for return, of Blair, an offender who had been irregularly taken to England from the
United States. The Blair case is discussed at length in O'Higgins, supra note 47, at
305-307.
70. 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 78.
71. Brandon S. Chabner, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act
of 1986: Prescribing and Enforcing United States Law against Terrorist Violence
Overseas, 37 UCLA L. REV. 985, 1020 (1990). See also OscAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 243 nn. 497, 498 (1991); John Quigley,
Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from Kidnapping of
Suspected Terrorists, 10 HuM. RTS. Q. 193, 211 (1988).
72. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
73. Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862 (D.Md. 1930), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931).
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vanced a scheme whereby an American official and his informer would
induce two suspected smugglers to cross the border and sell drugs to
these officials, who would then take the smugglers into custody. The
scheme failed due to the cautiousness of the smugglers. The American
agents killed one of the suspected smugglers and forcibly took the
other into the United States. Despite the prior inducement arrangement, Canada protested that its sovereignty had been violated by the
American agents and requested the extradition of the two American
agents on charges of murder, kidnapping, and larceny. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, reversing the district court's denial
of extradition on kidnapping charges, held that a U.S. federal officer
might be found guilty of kidnapping by a Canadian court.74
In Kear v. Hilton,75 a case connected to the Jaffe incident, the
court affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District
of Florida that Daniel Kear and Timm Johnsen, the two "bounty hunters" who had kidnapped Jaffe in Canada and brought him back to
Florida, were extraditable to Canada under the U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty. On June 9, 1986, Kear and Johnsen were sentenced to 21
months in prison for the abduction of Jaffe.7"
In the Rainbow Warrior incident, a Greenpeace vessel was sunk
in New Zealand internal waters as a result of the acts of French
agents. It was generally held that the French Government, by authorizing such acts, had committed a breach of international law and that,
apart from the responsibility of France itself, the individual agents
could not be exonerated by the so-called "immunity of attribution"
doctrine as committing state-like acts because these acts were committed in time of peace. Eventually, the individual agents responsible
were duly tried and convicted, and they received sentences imposed by
a New Zealand court.77
In a fourth example, Villareal and Hernandez v. Hammond,"
Mexico requested the extradition of the offenders on a charge of kidnapping under the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty of 1899. TM In that
case, the offenders sought to avoid extradition on the ground that they
had not removed the victim, Lopez, for an "unlawful end," as described
by the Treaty, but for the purpose of bringing him to the United States
for trial. The Fifth Circuit, affirming the judgment of the District

74. Collier, 51 F.2d, at 19.
75. Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
76. See 2 Men Imprisoned in Abduction Case, WASH. PosT, June 10, 1986, at C5.
77. See STARKE, supra note 8, at 101. On a German abduction case, see Stefan
Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction over Foreign Flag Vessels and the U.S. Courts: Adrift Without
a Compass?, 10 MICH. J. INTL L. 241 n. 46 (1989). See also Matthias Herdegen, Die
Achtung fremder Hoheitsrechte als Schranke nationalerStrafgewalt, 47 Z.A.O.R.V. 221,
239 (1987).
78. Villareal et. al. v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934).
79. Extradition Treaty (1899), U.S.-Mexico, 31 Stat. 1818, art. 2(16).
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Court for the Southern District of Texas, found that these abductors
were motivated more by a desire to collect the reward offered for the
capture of Lopez than by a concern for carrying out justice.'
The duty to repatriate the victim is firm and does not depend on
any treaty obligations, but the duty to punish or extradite the abductors must be based on the existence of an extradition treaty. As L.C.
Green put it,
[sihould the kidnapping be purely the result of private enterprise,
the state from which the individual had been abducted would have
to seek its remedy by requesting the surrender of the kidnappers
from the state to which they had gone, and at the same time to
request the return of the victim. There would be a legal obligation
to surrender the kidnappers only if there were an extradition treaty, specifying kidnapping as an extraditable crime, between the two
countries concerned."1
Damages for illegal kidnapping on foreign territory have been
awarded in certain cases, including The Chesapeake case' and the
Colunje case. In the Colunje case,' the Arbitration Commission
awarded damages of $500 for the illegal seizure of Colunje and the
unlawful criminal proceedings subsequently brought against him. This
holding indicates that damages may be claimed and awarded for the
illegal exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the abducting State.8 4
In the case of Napper Tandy, the municipal government of Hamburg
agreed to pay France 4,000,000 marks in damages for violating international law by surrendering two French officers to Great Britain.'
It follows that remedies should cover not only the original violation of international law - the act of abduction itself - but also any
subsequent violations, including the failure to make reparation and the
assertion of jurisdiction. In Ker, the court held that Ker could have an
action against the abducting Illinois agent for trespass and false imprisonment.' Following the Jaffe incident, the kidnapped individual

80. Villareal and Hernandez, 74 F.2d, at 506.
81. Green, Eichmann, supra note 34, at 508. See THE TIMES, July 22, 1960 (concerning the refusal of an Argentine court to extradite Jan Durcansky based on the
lack of an extradition treaty between Argentina and Czechoslovakia).
82. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
83. Guillermo Colunje (Panama) v. U.S., Claim, June 27, 1933, Ann. Dig. 193334, Case No. 96, 6 R. Intl Arb. Awards 342 (1933).
84. See O Higgins, supra note 47, at 297.
85. 4 KARL MARTENS, CAUSES CPL9BRES DU DROIT DES GENS 106 (2nd ed., 185861). The Napper Tandy case is also discussed in detail in O'Higgins, supra note 47,
at 297-300. Napoleon insisted upon the release of Tandy by Great Britain and instructed that the Treaty of Amiens was not to be signed until Tandy was restored
to France. The Crown eventually gave Tandy a pardon, and, in March 1802, Tandy
arrived in France. See O'Higgins, supra note 47, at 300.
86. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
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brought a civil tort action in the state court of New York against the
bonding company and the kidnapping bondsmen who were acting as
the company's agents in their mission to abduct and bring Jaffe from
Canada to Florida for trial."7 These cases further indicate that forcible
or fraudulent abduction may incur civil actions brought by the illegally
abducted individual.
B. ResponsibilitiesArising out of Non-State-SponsoredAbduction
The remedies available for abductions by private individuals or by
unauthorized initiative may be different than for state-sponsored abductions. In the Eichmann case, for example, Green argues that because the kidnappers were "private individuals indulging in private
enterprise, no international responsibility arises"; if they were "state
representatives, [and] should Israel decline to surrender Eichmann or
his captors, any claim by Argentina could be expiated.'
A State is not directly responsible for what its citizens have done,
but it is directly responsible for its own conduct. Abductions ordered,
authorized, or sponsored by the State involve an ab initio violation of
international law. The responsibility of the abducting State starts at
the moment the abducting act occurs, and the offending State, in addition to returning the abducted individual to the State of refuge or
residence, must apologize or openly admit that it violated the territorial sovereignty of the offended State, and/or it must make other appropriate reparations.
Forcible abductions conducted by purely private individuals without government involvement give rise to no violation of international
law. They do, however, constitute a violation of the internal law of the
offended State by the abducting individuals, and the State whose private citizens or unauthorized officials conducted the abduction abroad
does not bear international responsibility for the private or unauthorized act of abduction itself unless it subsequently "adopts" or "ratifies"
the act," fails to return or order the return of the abducted individual
to his country of refuge or residence, or fails to comply with a demand
for the extradition of the abducting individuals where an extradition
treaty applies.
As a result, in both Government-sponsored and non-Governmentsponsored abductions, the offending State has the duty to return the
abducted individual or order his return. Where appropriate, and in the
presence of an extradition treaty, the offending State has a duty to
punish or extradite the abductors or others responsible for the abduction. In non-government-sponsored abductions alone, however, the

87. Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1985), at 1371.
88. Green, Eichmann, supra note 34, at 515.
89. Cf. Mann, supra note 37, at 407.
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State whose nationals "privately" captured the abducted individual
abroad has no duty beyond effectuating the return of the abductee and
possibly punishing or extraditing the abductors.
International responsibility on the part of the State starts from
the moment when the State fails to return or order the return of the
abducted individual, and further responsibility would incur only when
the State arrests the abducted individual and subjects him to the local
proceedings upon his "arrival," forced by the "private" captors. Whether the captors are government officials or private citizens, and whether
the abduction is originally authorized or sponsored by the government,
the State whose unauthorized agents or private citizens engage in
extraterritorial captures assumes its responsibility as soon as it
adopts, sanctions, or takes advantage of the private or unauthorized
kidnapping activities. A State that fails to return the abducted individual and then arrests and prosecutes the individual has the same responsibilities as in a State-sponsored abduction.
IV. WRONGFUL ABDUCTION REQUIRES DIVESTMENT OF JURISDICTION
A. The Duty to Return Requires the Divestment of Jurisdiction
Since an abducting State has a duty to return illegally abducted
individuals to their country of refuge or residence, courts of the abducting State must refrain from exercising jurisdiction on the merits.
Professor Daniel O'Connell maintains that, although in certain cases
courts of the abducting State have "assert[ed] jurisdiction over a person irregularly seized in foreign territory, the seizing State is in breach
of international law in exercising its jurisdiction, . . . and there is
ground for asserting that, as a corollary, it owes a duty to the aggrieved State to return the offender thereto.' ° Further, "[in cases
involving kidnapping of individuals across international boundaries,
the general state practice is either to release the individual,... or to
refuse totally to exercise jurisdiction where individuals were brought
before the courts." Where courts of the United States accept in personam jurisdiction over defendants apprended in wrongful abductions,
those courts "commit a further internationally wrongful act: the denial
of justice."9 1
The Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime' proposes a duty on a kidnapping State to return
the kidnapped criminal to the place where he was seized and not to

90. 2 DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 833 (1970).

91. Fletcher N. Baldwin, Some Observations concerning External Power of Decentralized Units within the Context of the Treaty Making Powers of Article If and
Corresponding Transnational Implications, 2 FLA. J. INT'L L. 159, 198-199 (1986).

92. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INTL L.
SuPP. 435, art. 16, at 623-632 (1935).
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"prosecute" or "punish" him. Article 16 of the Draft states that
[Un exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall
prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its
territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures
in violation of international law or international convention without
first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have
been violated by such measures.'
The comment to Article 16 explains that "resort to measures in violation of international law or international convention" in obtaining custody of a person charged with crime "entails an international responsibility which must be discharged by the release or restoration of the
person taken, indemnification of the injured state, or otherwise."9'
The requirement to "release or restore the person taken" leads
necessarily to the conclusion that the abducting State and its municipal courts are precluded from exercising further jurisdiction over the
individual abducted abroad.
B. The Principleex injuriajus non oritur Requires the Divestment of
Jurisdiction
The late Professor Mann properly pointed out that the question
"courts of the world have ... failed to face . . . is not whether jurisdiction exists, but whether jurisdiction should be exercised." 5 The
illegality of the initial abducting act renders the subsequent exercise of
jurisdiction legally impossible. Illegal seizure of an accused in violation
of the territorial sovereignty of a State deprives the captors of the
power to try him, though their right to do so might not have been in
doubt had there been no abnormal circumstances.
It is a long established legal principle that an illegal act does not
give rise to any right (ex injuriajus non oritur). Since the act of abduction itself is illegal and invalid under international law, the abducting
State does not have a right to subject the abducted individual to its
laws and proceedings following such illegal abduction. Instead, it must
return the abducted individual to the place of his removal and make
other reparations as appropriate. No matter how much a suspect in a
foreign country is wanted at home, or how "international" an offender's
crime is, the abducting State may not establish and acquire its jurisdiction over such suspect or offender until the time when the abducted
individual is given an opportunity to be orderly and legally
transferred.
The transfer of an accused criminal must follow the procedure es-

93. Id. at 623.
94. Id.
95. Mann, supra note 37, at 414.
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tablished by the applicable extradition treaty or other agreements. The
State obtains jurisdiction when the released abductee voluntarily turns
himself in to the wanting State or when he voluntarily enters into an
area where the abducting State may apprehend him without violating
international law. Where the executive branch of the abducting government has not returned the abducted individual, the judicial branch
is under a duty to divest itself of jurisdiction over the abductee and
return him or order his return to the State where he was abducted.
Several legal theorists have corroborated this view. For instance,
Professor O'Connell convincingly states that where persons and things
are brought within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular State by
means constituting a violation of international law, or by means offensive to an extradition treaty or to the municipal law of another State,
"[a]priori one would suppose that the solution of the problem [of the
court's jurisdiction] would be found in the application of the maxim ex
injuriajus non oritur.'
Another commentator maintains that "abduction... violates international law by injuring the sovereignty of a foreign state ...

[and]

"should... not bear the fruit of the unlawfully gained advantage"
(emphasis added). 7 If the presence of the abducted individual may be
interpreted as "evidence," the application of an exclusionary rule under
the U.S. law "must reestablish the situation which the defendant was
in before he was kidnapped." In other words, "the criminal prosecution
must be preliminarily dismissed, and the prosecuting country may
then make a request for extradition." 8 The rules of international law
"(a) make removal of persons conditional on the existence of a treaty;
(b) require formal extradition proceedings; and (c) obligate the prosecuting country, in cases of abduction, to return the individual to the
country from which he was abducted.'
Regarding Jaffe, Baldwin notes that the abduction and removal by
U.S. citizens "acting under apparent color of state authority" violated Canadian territorial sovereignty, the United States-Canada Extradition Treaty, and "the personal rights of the fugitive guaranteed under customary and conventional international law and by the domestic
law of Canada,... thereby depriving the violating state of jurisdiction.""°
Morgenstern argued that the logical conclusion would be that
"municipal courts would decline to exercise jurisdiction over persons

96. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 90, at 831-832.
97. Wilfried Bottke, "Rule of Law" or "Due Process" as a Common Feature of
Criminal Process in Western Democratic Societies, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 419, 453

(1990).
98. Id. at 453-454.
99. Id.
100. Baldwin, supra note 91, at 199.
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and things brought before them in violation of international law [because] in exercising jurisdiction in such circumstances the court fails to
give effect to the rule of international law prohibiting the seizure; it
not only condones but gives effect to the violation of internationallaw"
(emphasis added).'
Morgenstern further stated that in "declining
jurisdiction which results directly from the original violation of international law, courts would merely uphold the fundamental maxim ex
injuriajus non oritur."'2 Morgenstern maintained that a violation of
customary international law "cannot give rise to legal consequences in
relation to any party.""°3 In addition, Morgenstern pointed out that
[pirinciple demands ... [that] municipal courts should decline to
exercise jurisdiction over persons or property which have been
seized in violation of international law. In acting thus, the courts
would enforce the rule of international law prohibiting the seizure,
and give effect to the general jurisprudential maxim ex injuriajus
non oriturc4

State practice also supports the view that jurisdiction does not
follow illegal abductions. There are numerous cases in which courts
have declined jurisdiction following the abduction of persons or the
seizure of things in violation of international law. For instance, it is an
established practice in France that vessels seized in the territorial waters of a neutral State may not become the object of prize proceedings. 5 In an 1832 case concerning the arrests of a Sardinian vessel
and its crew members in violation of a rule of customary international
law, the French Court of Appeal of Aix held that "the arrests constituted a violation of the law of nations, that they must, accordingly, be
considered null and void, and that the persons arrested must be released and conducted to Sardinian territory. " 1
Similarly, the German Supreme Prize Court, in the case concerning the capture of the Ambiorix, held that where the capture of an
enemy vessel "took place within the limits of the sovereignty of a neutral State, the act of capture is null and void, and the seizing State can
deprive no rights therefrom."' °7 In addition, in Great Britain, prize

101. Morgenstern, supra note 29, at 265.
102. Id. at 266.
103. Id. at 276.
104. Id. at 279.
105. See, e.g., In re Le Saint Michel (1792), in

1 ALPHONSE DE PISTOYE &
CHARLES DUVERDY, TRAIT9 DES PRISES MARITIMES 123 (1855); In re The Christiana
(1799), id. at 99 (1855); In re Le Frei (1871), in HENRI MARTIN BARBOUX, JURISPRUDENCE DU CONSEIL DES PRISES 66 (1872); In re The Heina (1915), in 1 PAUL
FAUCHILLE, JURISPRUDENCE FRANQAISE EN MATI.RE DE PRISES MARITIMES 119 (1916);

and In re The Tinos, id. at 309.
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courts have widely held that the seizure of enemy vessels within the
territorial waters of a neutral State constitutes a violation of international law and that such neutral State is entitled to claim the release
of vessels thus seized."°
Courts of the United States have followed these rulings in cases
involving the capture of vessels in violation of a treaty or in the territorial waters of another State in general and in cases involving the
capture of enemy vessels in the territorial waters of a neutral State in
particular." g For example, in United States v. Ferris,"° members of
the crew (consisting of British subjects) of a Panamanian ship were
prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the U.S. Prohibition and Tariff
Acts following seizure of the ship 270 miles off the west coast of the
United States. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to try the
crew members and that a fortiori a vessel seized in violation of an
international treaty and brought by force within reach of the court's
process should be released. The court stated that
as the instant seizure was far outside the limit (laid down by the
Treaty of 1924 between the United States and Panama), it is sheer
aggression and trespass... contrary to the treaty, not to be sanctioned by any court, and cannot be the basis of any proceeding adverse to the defendants ....

A decent respect for the opinions of

mankind, national honor, harmonious relations between nations,
and avoidance of war, require that the contracts and law represented by treaties shall be scrupulously observed, held inviolate, and in
good faith precisely performed - require that treaties shall not be
reduced to mere scraps of paper ....

It seems clear that, if one

legally before the court cannot be tried because therein a treaty is
violated, for greater reason one illegally before the court, in violation of a treaty, likewise cannot be subjected to trial. Equally in
both cases is there absence of jurisdiction."'
Another famous example is Cook v. United States."2 In that
case, officers of the United States Coast Guard boarded and seized a
British vessel, The Mazel Toy, at a point eleven and a half miles off
the Massachusetts coast and charged it with a violation of the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930. The seizure was found to be in violation of territorial limits fixed by a treaty then in force between the United States
and Great Britain. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the contention

108. See, e.g., The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Rob. 162 (1800); The Anna, 5 C. Rob.
373 (1805); The Pruissima Conception, 6 C. Rob. 45 (1805); The Valeria, [19211 1
A.C. 477; The Pellworm, [19221 1 A.C. 292.
109. See, e.g., The Anne, 3 U.S. (Wheat.) 435 (1818); The Lilla, 2 U.S. (Sprague)
177 (1862); The Sir William Peel, 5 U.S. (Wall.) 517 (1866); The Adela, 6 U.S.

(Wall.) 266 (1867).
110. U.S. v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (1927).
111. Id. See also Dickinson, supra note 15, at 239 n. 23.
112. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
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that the illegality of the seizure was immaterial. The Court held instead that the U.S. Government's subsequent action for forfeiture of
the vessel in the court of the United States was properly dismissed
since under the U.S.-U.K. treaty the forcible seizure was incapable of
giving the U.S. court power to adjudicate title to the vessel, regardless
of the vessel's physical presence within the court's jurisdiction. The
court stated that
the objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred
authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made ...
[but] that the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by the
Treaty [of 1924 between the United States and Great Britain] it
had imposed a territorial limitation upon its authority .... [The
U.S. Government also] lacked power, because of the Treaty, to
subject the vessel to [U.S.] laws." 3
The court held that in the absence of any act done within territorial
waters, or of an intention or attempt to do any act within territorial
waters, there was no basis for a proceeding against the vessel under
the United States Prohibition Act, stating that "[tlo hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose
and effect of the Treaty," and that "[t]he ordinary incidents of possession of the vessel and the cargo [must] yield to the international
agreement." 4
The underlying principle in these cases is the same as that relied
upon in cases involving forcible or fraudulent abduction of individuals:
the principle that persons or things seized in violation of international
law may not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of the seizing
State.
General State practice further supports this proposition. In
Dominguez v. State,"5 a Texas court held against the exercise of jurisdiction over an individual wrongly seized in Mexico in violation of a
U.S.-Mexico treaty and of international law. There, a U.S. expeditionary force had been sent into Mexico in "hot pursuit" of bandits.
Having apprehended a Mexican, the force discovered upon its return
that he was not one of the bandits pursued and he was thereupon
surrendered to local Texas authorities who proceeded to prosecute him
for a murder previously committed in Texas. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the Texas court was without jurisdiction to
prosecute him for the murder until he had been allowed an opportunity to return to Mexico. The court held that, since the expeditionary
force was acting under instructions from the U.S. Department of War,

113. Id. at 121.
114. Id. at 122.
115. Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92 (Tex.Crim.App 1921).
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it must be presumed that an agreement between Mexico and the United States had been reached, and consequently the rule of the extradition cases was applicable. The entry of the expeditionary force into
Mexico for the purpose of apprehending bandits would have been "a
violation of Mexican territory contrary to the law of nations in the
absence of consent of the Mexican Government." As a result, the court
held, the accused might resist trial for the murder until such time as
he should voluntarily subject himself to the jurisdiction of the United
States or until the consent of Mexico should be obtained."' The court
concluded that the same obligation that would restrain the United
States Government from breaking the implied limitations placed upon
it under its treaty with Mexico "would necessarily prevail" with reference to the agreement on the basis of the "comity of nations," and if
the legal obligation was the same, the abducted individual could not be
held for the offense "without the opportunity to return to his country.
. . [in order to] determine whether he shall be surrendered for trial
under the treaty of extradition."1 7
Similarly, in the well-known case of In re Jolis,"8 French officials had kidnapped a Belgian national in Belgian territory and taken
him to France to face prosecution. The French Tribunal Correctionnel
d'Avesnes held that the accused had a right to be released on the
ground that "the arrest, effected by French officers on foreign territory,
could have no legal effect whatsoever, and was completely null and
void"; that the court must take judicial notice of that "nullity being of
a public nature;" and that, therefore, "[t]he information leading to the
proceedings of arrest.

.

. , the proceedings themselves, the commit-

ment to prison on the same date, the remand1 9 order, and all that followed thereon must accordingly be annulled."
Another example is the Colunje claim."2 There, a policeman of
the Panama Canal Zone entered the territory of Panama, and by false
pretence induced Colunje, a Panamanian, to go to the Canal Zone.
Colunje was arrested by the police of the Zone and was subsequently
charged with a criminal offense before a Canal Zone court. The U.S.Panama commission held that "the police agents of the Zone by inducing Colunje by false pretence to come with them to the Zone with the
intent of arresting him there unduly exercised authority within the
jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama to the prejudice of a Panamanian citizen." Because a police agent was acting in the performance of

116. Id. at 97.
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2
his functions, the United States of America should be held liable. 1 '

An especially significant example is the controversial case of United States v. Toscanino122 . Toscanino was an Italian citizen and a resident of Uruguay. He was lured from his home in Montevideo by a telephone call placed by a local policeman named Hugo Campos Hermedia.
Hermdedia "was acting ultra vires in that he was the paid agent of the
United States government." Toscanino and his wife, seven months
pregnant at the time, were taken to a deserted area where Hermedia
and six other men abducted Toscanino, knocked him unconscious with
a gun, threw him into a car, bound and blindfolded him, and drove
him to the Uruguayan-Brazilian border. Toscanino alleged that the
U.S. agents then tortured and interrogated him for three weeks before
he was transported to the United States. Toscanino alleged that the
agents beat him, kept him awake for prolonged periods of time, injected fluids into his eyes and nose, and administered electric shocks to
his ears, toes, and private parts. 2 '
Toscanino subsequently stood trial before the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York and was sentenced to 20 years in
prison and fined $20,000 on narcotics counts. Toscanino moved to vacate the verdict, dismiss the indictment, and order his repatriation to
Uruguay. On November 2, 1973, the district court denied the motion
without a hearing, and, relying on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, held that
the manner in which Toscanino was brought into the territory of the
United States was immaterial to the court's power to proceed, provided
that he was physically present at the time of trial." The Court of
Appeals of the United States for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine does not apply to situations where criminals were brought into the U.S. court by means of forcible abductions
in violation of an international treaty, and that "abduction by one state
of persons located within the territory of another violate the territorial
sovereignty of the second state and are redressable usually by the return of the person kidnapped."" The appellate court reasoned that,
although the abduction of Toscanino from Uruguay did not violate the
extradition treaty between Uruguay and the United States, the abduction violated two other treaties: the U.N. Charter and the Organization
of American States Charter, which require the United States to respect
the territorial sovereignty of Uruguay.121 It also held that a U.S.
court must "divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
where it had been acquired as a result of the government's deliberate,
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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rights.""' The court noted that
when an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the
jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his person represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its own misconduct ....
[The Government should be barred] from realizing directly the fruits of its own deliberateand unnecessary lawlessness in
bringing the accused to trial (emphasis added)."

Accordingly, courts should "decline to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose presence has been secured by force or fraud."" 9 In so
holding, the court upheld the principle that "the government should be
denied the right to exploit its own illegal conduct," 3 ' and the principle of international law that "the territory of a State is inviolable" and
"may not be the object, even temporarily,...

[ofi measures of force

taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever."131
The judicial holdings in other recent abduction cases are also
instructive. In the case of S. v. Ebrahim, involving the abduction by
agents of South Africa of an accused in the territory of another
State, 3' the Court of Appeal of the Republic of South of Africa dismissed the prosecution on the ground that "abduction represents a
violation of the applicable rules of international law, that these rules
are part of our law, and that this violation of the law deprives the
Court ...

of its competence to hear [the accused's] case.""

In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez," the U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the forcible abduction of Rene
Martin Verdugo-Urquidez with the authorization or participation of
the United States violated the "purpose" of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. The court said that the violation,
together with Mexico's protest, would give the accused the right to
invoke the Treaty to defeat jurisdiction of the U.S. court." VerdugoUrquidez had been indicted for the murder of U.S. DEA Special Agent
Enrique Camarena-Salazar. The Ninth Circuit remanded for an-evidentiary hearing as to whether Verdugo-Urquidez's abduction had
been authorized or participated by U.S. authorities." The court stated that because the principle of specialty prohibits the trying of an ex127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 275, 281.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277, quoting Charter of the Organization of American States, supra
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tradited person for a crime other than that for which he was extradited, "if an individual has been kidnapped by a treaty signatory - i.e., if
he has not been extradited for any offense at all - he may not be detained, tried, or punished for any offense without the consent of the
nation from which he was abducted."137 The court noted that the purpose of extradition treaties, in part, is to safeguard the sovereignty of
signatory States and to ensure fair treatment of individuals. The court,
from the individual's enforcement of the specialty doctrine, concluded
that the individual had standing to raise a violation of the treaty as a
whole."s
Indeed, no matter whether the illegally seized subject matter is an
individual or an object, the violation of international law precludes the
delinquent State from proceeding to try and dispose of the subject matter. The only choice for the delinquent State and/or its courts is to
divest jurisdiction by releasing or ordering the release of the illegally
seized subject matter. As noted by Morgenstern, the rules and principles arising from the seizure of vessels in foreign territorial waters are
"essentially the same as those arising from the seizure of individuals
in foreign territory" - both kinds of seizure constitute a "violation both
of the sovereignty of the foreign state and of the rule of international
law which prohibits the exercise of acts of authority within the territorial jurisdiction of other states." As a result, the courts of the seizing
State should "decline to give effect to such a seizure and thereby enforce the rule of international law prohibiting it,"139 and, unless the
seizure is authorized under international law, "the court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case."14 °
C. The Jurisdictionof Municipal Courts Can Be No Higher than that
of their State
The extent of the jurisdiction of a State limits the competence and
therefore jurisdiction of its municipal courts. Where the State does not
have the authority under international law to exercise its national
jurisdiction over a certain individual or thing, the courts of its subdivisions do not have such jurisdiction either. Under no circumstances, as
far as international law is concerned, can the jurisdiction of municipal
courts be broader than that of their State as a whole. If the State itself
does not have the authority to abduct individuals, then its municipal
courts may not assume and exercise jurisdiction either because the
extent of the courts' jurisdiction can never go higher than that of the
State itself.
Dickinson, on the jurisdiction of municipal courts over illegally
137.
138.
139.
140.
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seized persons or things, stated that
[ilt may be urged that only the injured foreign state is in a position
to protest against the violation of international law and that, in
any case, the alleged violation of international law presents an
issue which should be resolved by international negotiation or in an
international forum. On the other hand .... since the seizure or
arrest was made in excess of the state's proper competence, and in
violation of the rights of a foreign state, there is in consequence no
national competence to invoke local process or to subject the thing
or the person to local law. If there is no national competence, obviously there can be no competence in the courts, which are only an
arm of the national power. To hold otherwise... would go far to
defeat the purpose and nullify the efficacy of international law
(emphasis added)."'
Dickinson maintained that "[if the original arrest or seizure is illegal
because in violation of treaty, it is logical to conclude that no competence is acquired thereby ... [and] [ilf the original arrest or seizure is
in violation of treaty, it would be shortsighted policy which permitted
the court to draw a dark curtain before the wrong done by one nation
to another, however desirable it may be to impose a well-merited penalty or forfeiture upon the individual concerned."142 "In terms of
American precedents," Dickinson continued, "this means that the underlying principle of United States v. Rauscher is correct and that the
distinction attempted in Ker v. Illinois is arbitrary, unsound, and
should be repudiated; that the principle of The Mazel Toy is unimpeachable; and that such cases as The Ship Richmond and The Merino
must be relegated to the category of cases discredited and overruled."143 He concluded that
[tlo hold otherwise would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of
the salutary principle, well established in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 'International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination.'1"
In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, Justice Marshall stated
that "[tihe jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed
by the nation as an independent sovereign power." 4 ' What the judiciary, being merely an arm of the State, is authorized to do is no
more than what the State is permitted to do under international law.
In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Cook case correctly held
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that, since the U.S. "Government itself lacked power to seize," due to a
U.S.-Britain treaty, it "lacked power.., to subject the [illegally seized]
vessel to our laws," and that it would further "nullify the purpose and
effect of the Treaty" should the "wrongful seizure" be followed by "adjudication" - that is, the exercise of jurisdiction by the court on the
merits.'" As Dickinson commented on that decision, the objection in
that case "was not to the jurisdiction of the court alone, but to 'the
jurisdiction of the United States' as a whole.147
D. Silence of the Offended State Does Not Authorize Abduction and
Subsequent Proceeding
There are some who suggest that a court should divest itself of
jurisdiction only when there is a protest from the offended State. One
author, for example, states that the "prevailing practice" in international law is that "states refrain from trying fugitives illegally brought
within their jurisdiction when there is a protest from the state of abduction demanding return" (emphasis added); such practice in the
United States "seems to be suggested in Lujan, and, to some extent, in
Toscanino."'4 Another author argues that if an injured State objects
to the jurisdiction of the abducting State, "then [its] government could
have explicitly demanded [the kidnapped to be] return."49 As a result, in the United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,'" since Mexico failed
to demand return, as it also did in the Alvarez-Machain case, the court
could have exercised jurisdiction, and the "striking difference" between
Mexico's responses to the Alvarez-Machain and Verdugo-Urquidez
abductions "lends credence to the U.S. government's view that Mexico
intended its action to lead to a diplomatic resolution of the VerdugoUrquidez matter."'
In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,'52 the court acknowledged that no nation enjoys unbridled discretion in obtaining personal
jurisdiction over criminals residing in a foreign country. Nevertheless,
the court held the conduct of U.S. agents must be "of the most outrageous and reprehensible kind" to result in the denial of due process,
and only where the offended State protested could the court divest itself
of jurisdiction over illegally abducted criminals.'53 The court, relying
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on the proposition that "consent or acquiescence by the offended State
waives any right it possessed and heals any violation of international
law,""5 found that neither Argentina nor Bolivia, the countries where
the forcible abductions had occurred, had declared that its sovereignty
had been violated, and such failure to protest was "fatal" to the
abductee's attempt to rely on the Charter of the United Nations."M
There are other cases to the same effect. In United States v. Reed,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "absent
protest or objection by the offended sovereign [the accused] had no
standing to raise violation of international law as an issue." 56 On
December 19, 1986, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany also held
that international law did not preclude the prosecution of an accused
seized by fraud, but the offended foreign nation had a right of restitution founded on international law that "could preclude the exercise of
German jurisdiction."'57 The defendant involved in that decision had
been induced by a German agent in the Netherlands to enter the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, where he was arrested and
sentenced to eleven years in prison. On October 23, 1985, the German
Federal Supreme Court rejected the accused's appeal on the merits. On
January 6, 1986, the Dutch Government demanded "the immediate
restoration" of the accused. On June 3, 1986, the German Federal Constitutional Court initially refused leave to appeal." The defendant
later was able to re-appeal to the German Federal Supreme Court, and
on December 19, 1986 secured an order that stayed the proceedings so
that the Federal government could comply with the demand of the
Netherlands." 9 In essence, the German Supreme Court held that the
court could exercise jurisdiction in the absence of demand from the
Dutch Government for the abductee's return.
In the Re Argoud case, involving the kidnapping of a French rebel
by French agents in Munich, a special French Court of State Security
held similarly."M In February 1963, former French Colonel Antoine
Argoud, who had joined the Secret Army that plotted in the early
1960s to frustrate President de Gaulle's efforts to end the war between
France and Algeria by granting independence to the latter, was abducted from Munich by French agents and forcibly brought back to France
to stand trial. The special Court of State Security, based on a declara-
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LES ARRESTATIONS INTERNATIONALEMENT IRRIkGULI9RES (1965).
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tion by the French Foreign Ministry that no communication had been
received from the West German Government, rejected Argoud's contention that he had been abducted in violation of international law. The
special Court convicted and sentenced him to life imprisonment for
insurrection. The court held that Argoud "who claims to be injured...
lacks the right or capacity to plead in judicial proceedings a violation
of international law, a fortiori when the State concerned makes no
claim."16 '
The position that the French court could exercise jurisdiction over
Argoud in the absence of a protest from the German Government was
merely a subterfuge, however, because Argoud's defense was again
rejected even after the German Government had demanded his return.
On November 16, 1963, the German Federal Parliament requested the
German Federal Government to demand Argoud's return, 2 but the
Court of State Security refused to accept Argoud's submission of the
German official representation as evidence. On December 28, 1963,
upon appeal, the French Cour de Cassation, notwithstanding the irregularity and the express German demand, upheld the jurisdiction to try
Argoud. It held that "even accepting that Argoud had been abducted
on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in violation of the
rights of that country and of its sovereignty, it would be for the Government of the injured State alone to complain and demand reparation." Further, Argoud as an individual "has no capacity to plead a
contravention of the rules of public international law and could not
claim to find in them a personal basis for immunity from judicial proceedings. " l"
The propositions made by these courts and authors, however, are
dubious. First, a fair reading of the Toscanino case does not lead to the
conclusion that the court intended to divest itself of jurisdiction only
where the offended State had lodged a protest.'
Second, in an abduction case, the abducted individual often could
hardly know whether the offended State had lodged a protest, and the
abducting State must disclose the absence or existence of a protest."
Even if the abducted individual is informed that there is no protest
from the country whose territorial integrity has been impugned, it is
still difficult to infer that the offended country has consented to his abduction and trial. At the least, it must be established that the offended
State had prior knowledge of the plan and the actual operation of the
abduction and failed to either approve or disapprove and such failure

161. 92 CLUNET, supra note 160, at 96; 45 I.L.R. at 94.
162. See Carl Doehring, Restitutionsanspruch,Asylrecht und Auslieferungsrecht im
Fall Argoud, 25 Z.A.O.R.V. 209 (1965).
163. 92 CLUNET, supra note 160, at 100; 45 I.L.R. at 97-98.
164. See supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text.
165. See Mann, supra note 37, at 410.
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amounted to acquiescence or consent. The burden of proof, therefore,
should be on the prosecuting State to show acquiescence or consent.
Third, it is extremely difficult for the abducting State to prove
that the mere antecedent and subsequent silence constitutes a form of
consent. The best view would be that only where the arresting State
had acquired prior express and affirmative consent (though not necessarily written) from the State of refuge or residence can it justify its
extraterritorial apprehension and subsequent proceedings. Subsequent
silence (or even approval) does not alter the illegal nature of the abduction and cannot be counted as a basis for the act of abduction itself
and for subsequent proceedings. In a recent comment, Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld notes that "too much is made of the assertion of
protest by the foreign government in abduction cases." Lowenfeld further states that "silence on the part of the foreign state should not be
construed as giving consent to an abduction."'6
Fourth, the presence or absence of protest or consent must also
yield to human rights considerations. In his article "U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad," Professor Lowenfeld points out that "acting under authority of the United States on foreign soil contrary to the will of the
foreign state is wrong under international law," and that "silence or
even consent by a foreign state cannot make right what is not right,
either under the international law of human rights or... under the
U.S. Constitution."167
The emphasis ... on the lack of protest by foreign states when
suspects are abducted from their territory is disquieting. For one
thing, the states that do not protest tend to be, if not client states,
at any rate states that have various reasons not to make formal
protests. For another, even when silence can be fairly interpreted
as consent - which ... is often hard to tell - such consent cannot
extend to violation of the rights of the accused."U
As Chabner notes, there are certain municipal cases suggesting that
even in the absence of a formal protest by the asylum country whose
territorial sovereignty was violated, "an abducted individual would
have standing to argue that the United States failure to extradite
of an existing treaty should divest a court of its
according to the terms
" 16 9
personal jurisdiction.

166. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Still More on Kidnapping, 85 AM. J. INTL L. 655, 661
(1991).
167. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
InternationalLaw, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 451 (1990).
168. Id. at 489.

169. Chabner, supra note 71, at 1020. Cf United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146,
151 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument based on alleged lack
v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, at 307-08 (llth Cir. 1987) (holding that
the defendant from Canada "constitutes a treaty violation" where
were involved, indicating that Canada's protest was not necessary
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the kidnapping of
government actors
for the kidnapping

DENy. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

VOL. 23:1

In a case involving the abduction in Argentina by Uruguayan
security and intelligence forces of a Uruguayan citizen, the U.N. Human Rights Committee held that the abduction violated Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,170 and, accordingly, the abducting State had a duty to make effective reparations, including the immediate release of the abducted individual. 1
As a result, from the point of view of the international law of human
rights, whether the offended State keeps silent, whether its silent
amounts to acquiescence, or even whether it has expressly renounced
its right to demand reparations is irrelevant, for the wrongfully abducted individual is entitled to due process of law and remedies under
relevant and applicable international treaties.
Moreover, the duty of the offender to make reparation to the offended State is also independent of the presence or absence of the offended State's formal protest and demand. The major purpose of reparations is to correct wrongs and to diminish, eliminate, and prevent
further international wrong-doing. Should the wrong-doer be excused
from making reparations simply because the offended party did not
protest, was unable or unwilling to protest, or dared not to do so, international misconduct would be further encouraged and promoted, and
the international society would be likely to turn into a more and more
lawless and violent anarchy.
For various practical reasons, offended States have often kept
silent after an affront to their sovereignty had occurred, but this silence is not a controlling factor. As Mann said, "acquiescence presupposes knowledge of all the relevant facts and cannot be inferred from
mere silence," and even if the offended State "had deliberately and in
knowledge of all relevant facts decided to ignore the incident, this
would not have abolished the breach of customary or conventional
international law."172 For example, Panama's new government, as the
political foe of ousted General Noriega and installed with the armed
assistance of the United States force, naturally did not and would not
protest against the forcible abduction and removal from Panama or the
subsequent conviction and imprisonment of Noriega, who is understandably labeled as a "dictator." The lack of "protest" from the new

to constitute a "treaty violation").
170. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). Article 9(1)
of the Covenant provides that "[no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law." Cf.
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), UN
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile").
171. Views of Human Rights Committee on Complaint of L6pez, July 29, 1981, 36
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40), at 176-184, UN Doc. A136/40 (1981).
172. Mann, supra note 37, at 410.
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Panamanian government may not be interpreted to suggest that no
violation of the Panamanian sovereignty had ever occurred at all and
that the U.S. federal courts could therefore have lawfully exercised
jurisdiction over General Noriega' 73
Finally, to nullify an illegal extraterritorial apprehension and to
prohibit subsequent prosecution, the form of protest the injured State
adopts is insignificant, and whether the injured State formally protests
at all is immaterial. What is important is that where the nation as a
whole does not have jurisdiction to abduct an individual from abroad
and subject him to its law by such illegal means, its courts do not have
jurisdiction to try the abducted either. It is even more important for all
States to abandon or abstain from the practice of forcible abduction
overseas in the absence of prior and express consent from the country
concerned. Whether the offended State protests or demands the return
of the abducted individual is totally irrelevant to the question whether
the court of the abducting should exercise its jurisdiction. 7 '
Nonetheless, despite the stated objections to the proposition that a
court may divest itself of jurisdiction in an abduction case only where
the offended State protests or demands for the return of the abductee,
it is best advised that an offended State always formally protest
against the abduction and demand the return of the abducted individual. Where appropriate, the country should also demand the extradition of the abductors or other responsible individuals. Formal and express protests and demands may facilitate the offending nation to
better realize the unlawful nature of its conduct and the consequences
under international law and admonish it to refrain from further misconduct.
V. THE DUTY TO OBSERVE AND GIVE EFFECT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

In some of the cases in the Ker line, the courts do not seem to
have completely ignored the illegality of the unauthorized seizures
from foreign soil and the consequences of such illegality. Nevertheless,
they refused to order the return of the illegally seized individuals to

173. For an analysis of the invasion of Panama and the arrest of General
Noriega, see Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama
under International Law, 84 AM. J. INTrL L. 494, 502 (1990) (stating that "the U.S.
action [in Panama] was in disregard of the pertinent norms and principles of international law on the use of force" and was "evidently dictated by political considerations, in disregard of faithful adherence to the existing norms on the use of force");
Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 503 (1990);
Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84
AM. J. INVL L. 516 (1990).
174. See Mann, supra note 37, at 411 (stating that "[t]here is . . . no justification
for the suggestion which has sometimes been intimated . . . that it is relevant to
the question of the court's jurisdiction whether a demand for the return has been
made.").
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the State of refuge. The courts failed to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the seized individuals on the ground that any adjustment
to the situation would be made between the governments of the offending State and the offended State and that questions involving international law should be left for the executive department of the government.
For instance, in The Ship Richmond case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that an offense against a foreign power in whose territorial waters the U.S. naval force seized an American vessel "must be adjusted
between the two governments" and that the court "can take no cognizance of it."'75 The Supreme Court of Vermont stated that the violation of the sovereignty of another State "is a matter which concerns
the political relations of the two countries, and in that aspect is a subject not within the constitutional powers of [the] court." 7 According
to the Ker court, the remedy for the breach of international law is at
the diplomatic level, and the court has nothing to do with it.'77 In
Alvarez-Machain III, the court also held that "the decision of whether
[the abducted individual] should be returned to Mexico, as a matter
outside of the [Extradition] Treaty, is a matter for the Executive
Branch."7
The division of powers among the administrative, legislative, and
judicial branches of the government does not provide any basis for the
courts of a State, nor for any other branch of its government, to dishonor the obligations of the State as a whole under international
law.'79 According to Starke, a State - including its municipal courts,
of course - cannot rely on provisions of its domestic law to avoid its
international obligations, nor can it plead that "its domestic law exonerated it from performing obligations imposed by an international treaty"; in fact, a State is required "to pass the necessary legislation to fulfill its international obligations.""8
The opinion of the Finnish Ships Arbitration case states that "[a]s
to the manner in which its municipal law is framed, the State has
under international law, a complete liberty of action, and its municipal
law is a domestic matter in which no other State is entitled to concern
itself, provided that the municipal law is such as to give effect to all
the international obligations of the State." 8 ' The Draft Declaration of
175. The Ship Richmond v. The United States, 13 U.S. 102, 104 (1815).
176. Vermont v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 121-22 (1835).
177. Ker, 119 U.S., at 442.
178. Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct., at 2196. See also Ex Parte Lopez, 6 F.Supp.
342, 344 (1934).
179. See Jianming Shen, Revisiting the Disability of the Non-Recognized in the
Courts of the Non-Recognizing States and Beyond: The Departure of the In re
Guanghua Liay Courts from the Rules, 5 FLA. INTL L.J. 401, 461-462 (1990).
180. STARKE, supra note 8, at 88-89 (1989). See also Advisory Opinion on the
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (1928), P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 15, at 26-27.
181. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1484. See also Advisory Opinion on the Exchange of
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Rights and Duties of States prepared by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides, in relevant part, that "[e]very State has the
duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in
or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duits constitution
82
ty."
In United States v. Rauscher,'" the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the specialty principle incorporated in a treaty of extradition. The
Court stated that the treaty was "the supreme law of the land, which
the courts are bound to take judicial notice of and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of that
treaty."" In Dominguez v. State, the Texas court also stated that an
extradition treaty "is part of the law of the land, binding upon courts
and available to person having rights secured or recognized thereby,
and may be set up as a defense to a criminal prosecution established
in disregard thereof.""
Courts of other nations have held similarly. The Supreme Court of
South Africa recently recognized that rules of international law prohibiting international abduction "are part of our law," and the deviation
from such rules would divest the court of its jurisdiction to try an
abducted individual. 8 " In Fiscal v. Samper, the Supreme Court of
Spain maintained that
[tihe extradition treaty between Spain and Portugal... must be
considered... as a constituent part of Spanish legislation and,
consequently, of sufficient force to regulate the matter which it
covers, not only as to the international relations of the contracting
States, but also as to the juridical situation of those extradited from
Portuguese Republic upon a request made by the Spanish
courts .... Article 9 of the treaty provides that individuals delivered by virtue of the said convention may not be tried for any previous crime different from that which was the basis of extradition .... [Tihe crime considered [in the present case] is distinct
from that which underlay the extradition .... Accordingly, the
appellant cannot be condemned. 81
Professor Dickinson opined that a court should not avoid giving
effect to an applicable treaty simply because the other signatory State
"is not a party to the litigation" and that the circumstance "that the

Greek and Turkish Populations (1925), P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 10, at 20.

182. Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, Report of the ILC covering
its First Session 12 April-9 June 1949, U.N. G.A.O.R., 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(A/925), at 7 ff., art. 13.
183. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886).
184. Id. at 422.
185. Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92, 99 (1921).
186. S. v. Ebrahim, S. Afr. L. Rep. (Apr.-June 1991), at 8-9.
187. Fiscal v. Samper, Ann. Dig., 1938-1940, Case No. 152.
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injured nation is not a party to the litigation" should not be heavily
weighed.' Once the issue "has been submitted to the court... [and)
the property or person which the injured nation is entitled to protect is
before the court," the court should not lose "the opportunity to undo
the wrong by restoring the property or releasing the person.""
Dickinson maintained that insisting that the decision to restore the
illegally seized property or to release the wrongly abducted individual
"belongs to a higher forum . . . is to abdicate a function which the
court, particularly the court of a country in which international law
and treaties are regarded as part of the law of the land, ought unhesitatingly to perform .... [since] [tihe question is not political, but is one
clearly within the competence of the national court.""9
Accordingly, the judicial branch of the Government, like its executive and legislative counterparts, is under an obligation to carry out
the State's duties under international law and enforce that law domestically where applicable. A municipal court may not excuse itself from
observing established rules of international law and applicable treaty
provisions by simply leaving international law issues to the political
branch of the Government. Refusal of municipal courts to take judicial
cognizance of and give effect to rules and principles of international
law would amount to another wrong in addition to the initial breach of
international law committed by the executive branch.
The respect for law, international and domestic, by both the people and the Government, is an important element of any modern society. The use of illegal means to achieve the "just" end of enforcing the
law constitutes an abuse of power and in the end increases the disrespect for the law. It is well-established at common law that the abuse
of power may result in the staying of any criminal proceedings.19 In
R. v. Bow Street Magistrates,ex parte Mackeson, an English court held
that the institution of criminal proceedings against an individual illegally abducted from Zimbabwe was an abuse of process and that the
proceedings had to be stayed."9 In R. v. Harley,93 the New Zealand
Court of Appeal refused to allow the prosecution to proceed against an
accused who, in violation of an existing extradition treaty, had been
illegally abducted from Australia. The court maintained that "this
must never become an area where it will be sufficient to consider that
the end has justified the means," and that "the means which were
adopted to make a trial possible were 'so much in conflict with one of
the most important principles of the rule of law' that the discharge of

188. Dickinson, supra note 15, at 236.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 236-237.
191. See, e.g., Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, A.C. 1254 (1964); Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphreys, 2 All. E.R. 497 (1976).
192. R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte Mackeson, 75 Cr.App. R. 24 (1981).
193. R. v. Harley, [19781 2 N.Z.L.R. 199.
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the prisoner was unavoidable."" Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v.
United States, thoughtfully stated that
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct
that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously ....

If the government becomes a lawbreaker it

breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of
a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution.'
The practice of combatting terrorism, drug trafficking, and other
transnational crimes by illegal means "is a great danger" to society
and potentially innocent people, and,
for this reason alone, neither society nor the law must allow a departure from the great principle that no illegality must ever bear
fruit ....

It is the underlying moral force, the respect for the law,

that should prevail. Hardly any idea is greater than that of government by law rather than expediency

.

.

. [and] law includes

international law. Consequently, whether or no[t] the injured State
protests or otherwise objects, the abduction of the accused from its
territory, by force or by stealth, should be treated.., as a misuse
of [the] exercise [of jurisdiction]."'

When the accused so abducted is brought before the court, the
court, as an arm of the Government, has an opportunity, and a duty,
to take notice of and give effect to rules and principles of international
law and to undo the nation's wrong by ordering the restoration of the
accused. By refusing to exercise jurisdiction on the merits until the
accused is obtained through due process of law they serve that purpose. In so doing, and only in so doing, may the court better help
achieve the goal of promoting the respect for and observation of the
law, domestic and international.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Alvarez-Machain II court and the courts in similar cases
wrongly applied and interpreted the so-called Ker-Frisbiedoctrine. The
initial proposition that the court will not divest itself of jurisdiction
simply because of an irregularity in the mode of the accused's appre-

194. Id. Cf Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C., at 1354 (per
Lord Devlin) (stating the "[tihe courts cannot contemplate for a moment the transference to the Executive of the responsibility for seeing that the process of law is not
abused.").
195. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928). See also Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951).
196. Mann, supra note 37, at 419.
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hension applies only to the extent that no violation of international
law is involved. The proposition does not apply, and should not have
been applied, to cases of transnational abduction involving a violation
of (1) the territorial sovereignty of another nation; (2) applicable international treaties, if any; or (3) international law. The Ker-Friesbie
doctrine, therefore, ought to be superseded or abandoned in its entirety
insofar as international abduction cases are concerned.
The municipal courts of a State have a duty to take judicial notice
of and give effect to international law, and this duty requires the
courts to nullify the unauthorized abductions by the State and to order
the return of the abducted individual to his refuge State. The courts'
exercise of jurisdiction over such individual not only amounts to a
failure to give effect to international law but also constitutes an approval, sanction, and effectuation of the State's original violation of
international law.
When a violation of international law has in fact been committed,
the offending nation (and its courts) must take such measures as appropriate to correct its wrongs, including measures of restitution. If
courts fail to do so, they take advantage of that violation and thereby
commit another wrong under international law. In forcible abduction
cases, the abducting State, particularly through its court system, has
the opportunity to redress its violation by restoring the situation to its
prior status - e.g., by returning the abducted individual to the State
where he was removed. As Mann pointed out, "the return of the abducted person does not eliminate the initial wrong (as is shown by the fact
that a claim for damages may be pursued by the injured State even
after the return), [but] the failure to comply with a request for the return of the abducted person is a separate wrong which is quite independent of the original one.""9 The word "request," however, should
be understood to include the requirement of international law to return and to make other reparations, not merely a demand made by the
offended State.
The State whose private citizens or unauthorized officials have
abducted an individual in a foreign country is also under an obligation
possibly to punish or extradite the abductors, even if it is not directly
responsible for the private act of abduction itself unless and until it
adopts, ratifies, or otherwise bears the fruits of such "private" abduction. When the State takes advantage of an unauthorized private abduction, the difference between a Government-sponsored abduction and
a non-Government-sponsored abduction becomes irrelevant, and in
either case the offending State bears its international responsibilities
virtually at the same level.
While the act of abduction itself is an exercise of the abducting

197. Id. at 411.
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State's jurisdiction in the territory of another State - an apparently
illegal act under international law - the subjection of the individual
thus abducted to the laws and proceedings of the abducting State constitutes a continuation of this invalid extention of its jurisdiction, as
well as a continuation of its infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of the latter State.
The jurisdiction of the courts of the abducting State is no broader
than that of their State itself. Since the abducting State does not have
the competence and jurisdiction necessary to abduct an individual
abroad and to subject him to laws and proceedings through such
means, its municipal courts do not possess the competence and jurisdiction necessary to try the individual following his abduction either.
Finally, and most importantly, no rights flow from an illegal act.
The maxim ex injuriajus non oritur should be the governing principle
such that no illegal act may bear the fruit of advantages gained by
means of illegality. If abduction is ab initio illegal, null, and void under international law, no alleged subsequent "right" deriving from the
act of abduction can be legally established and exercised under international law. The illegality of the prior act of abduction renders all
subsequent acts of trial and prosecution unlawful, defective, and invalid as well.
The duty of a court to order the return of an abducted individual
and to divest itself of jurisdiction is not premised upon the existence of
the offended State's protest or demand for reparation. The proposition
that the court should divest itself of jurisdiction where the injured nation protests or demands is a more rational and progressive one than
the proposition that insists upon the court's "right" to exercise jurisdiction, irrespective of the mode of the accused's apprehension even if the
offended State protests and demands for his release. The first proposition, however, is still a step away from the logical conclusion of the
maxim ex injuria jus non oritur that illegal abduction does not give
rise to the right to exercise jurisdiction irrespective of whether the
offended nation protests against the abduction and/or requests for the
release of the abductee.
The offended State's protests or express demands for the return of
the abducted individual are declaratory of the illegal nature of forcible
or fraudulent abduction and serve to intensify the existing duty of the
courts of the abducting State to refrain from exercising jurisdiction
over the abducted individual. While it is advisable that the offended
State should always protest any and all abduction activity in its territory, such protests or demands are certainly not required for the courts
of the offending State to carry out the duty to divest themselves of
jurisdiction and to order the return of the individual concerned.

